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The Economy 
 
Lok-sang Ho* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the economic policy since the handover. Evidence is 
presented and the case is argued that the serious recession and fiscal 
problems in 1998 were essentially a result of misguided housing policy. 
Hong Kong’s subsequent recovery and return to fiscal health, too, were 
essentially a result of a bold effort to reverse that misguided policy in late 
2002. The paper commends the SAR government for its pragmatism and 
courage in the “incursion” in the stock market in the summer of 1998. 
CEPA was of course a great achievement for both Hong Kong and the 
Mainland, and Hong Kong’s future definitely is closely tied to the future 
course of the Mainland economy. Tighter integration with the Mainland is 
therefore both necessary and logical. However, CEPA played only a minor 
role in the recovery. The many “structural problems” often alluded to by 
commentators similarly had little to do with Hong Kong’s difficulties from 
1998 to 2003. The best proof is that Hong Kong has managed to recover 
without a major surgery to its economic policy. Still, with widening income 
disparity and many Hong Kong people in dire poverty, Hong Kong does 
need a major rethinking of its economic policy if the prosperity and 
stability of the society are to be sustained. 
 
Introduction 
 
To discuss the Hong Kong economy after the handover, it is fitting to refer 
first to the Fortune Magazine story in 1995 foretelling “the death of Hong 
Kong.”  For a few years, it did look as if these dire predictions were 
vindicated.  Yet Hong Kong bounced back dramatically after hitting 
trough during the SARS episode in 2003 at a pace that few analysts 
believed was possible.  Although the government had always found the 
credit rating companies far too pessimistic, even its officials had always 
thought that balancing the fiscal budget was out of the question before 
2008/2009.  Yet the government managed to come up with a real fiscal 
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surplus as early as 2005/2006,1 and by 2006/2007 the fiscal surplus had 
become rather sizable.   
 
Just as the return to black ink came unexpected, so the red ink that began in 
1998/99 had come as a surprise.  In fiscal 1997-98, the operational 
surplus was $86.9 billion.  At that time, emotions were high, and Mr. 
Tung Chee-hwa, the first Chief Executive of the SAR government, became 
over confident because the overall situation appeared superb and the 
prospects were extremely rosy.  Most important of all, he had plenty of 
fiscal room to maneuver, certainly much more than any of the governors 
during colonial times.  At the time, however, I wrote: 
 
Hong Kong’s fiscal strength can be attributed to strength in the 
property and stock markets, while Hong Kong’s apparent fiscal 
restraint is to a certain extent an accounting illusion.  If the property 
market and the stock market should fail to perform, Hong Kong 
would immediately run into fiscal trouble.  To the extent that the 
property market is considered having run ahead of economic 
fundamentals, Hong Kong’s fiscal problems cannot be too far 
away.(Ho, 1997a, p.90) 
 
Unfortunately, Tung was too overjoyed at the handover to take heed.  He 
announced his ambitious plan to raise the homeownership rate to 70 per 
cent in ten years, and a scheme to turn public rental housing into ownership 
units called the Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS) became a key component 
of his strategy.  The TPS was welcomed by all political parties alike and 
was particularly popular among public housing tenants, but it proved to be 
a disaster for the homeowner middle class (Ho, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 
1998e, 2003, 2006.)  By severing the homeownership ladder, the housing 
market collapsed through a domino mechanism, bringing the Hong Kong 
economy to a deep recession that is more appropriately called a small 
depression in 1998.  Yet my analysis then was met with disbelief and even 
ridicule (Miller, 1998, Mondejar and Boardman, 1998).  The SAR 
government simply ignored my plea to change its misguided housing 
policy.   
 
                                                 
1 Actually as early as 2004/2005 already there was a measured fiscal “surplus” when the 
revenue of a modest $5 billion bond flotation was counted.   
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The rapidity and the extent of the decline of the economy took virtually all 
observers by surprise.  But the economic decline seemed to have 
vindicated the Fortune Magazine article’s argument.  Many regarded it as 
symptomatic of more serious structural problems that had been obscured 
by a superficial economic bloom leading to the handover.  To see the 
general thrust of such lines of thinking, consider Sin-ming Shaw’s article in 
the Time Magazine, 3 September 2001.  There he wrote: 
 
“Hong Kong is having trouble competing, not only with a rising 
China, but against a world built on brains, not asset trading. As the 
mainland maintains its rapid growth rates, Hong Kong is barely 
above water after three years of stagnation.... 
 
“Hong Kong… is too expensive, in terms of both wages and real 
estate, and its government is too big. University graduates have poor 
skills not only in English but in Chinese, too. Corporations are hiring 
in the mainland, and firing in Hong Kong. Premier Zhu Rongji, a 
former Shanghai mayor, allowed the mainland property bubble to 
burst in the mid-’90s without intervention. Now, Shanghai and other 
Chinese cities are bursting with new businesses in part because both 
wages and asset prices are but a fraction of Hong Kong’s.”  
 
Again, in a report by a team of academics from the Hong Kong University 
of Science and Technology (HKUST Forum on the Future Development of 
Hong Kong May-July 2002), the following “structural problems” are cited: 
 
1. Over-dependence on land sales and the property sector for 
revenue. Once the property sector declined, decrease in revenues 
was inevitable.  
2. When Hong Kong manufacturers decided to move their 
production base to the Chinese hinterland, rather than upgrade 
their capabilities in Hong Kong, they created an economy 
over-reliant on the service sector, which now accounts for 86% 
of Hong Kong’s GDP. 
3. Industrial policy-making has traditionally been limited in Hong 
Kong. The lack of coordinated preparation for the high-tech 
economy, in terms of education, training and manpower, R&D 
 4
investment, and identification of core industries, has left Hong 
Kong far behind other economies. 
4. The Government has abrogated responsibility for nurturing 
competitiveness because of local politics before and after the 
handover. The lack of interest in innovation and technology may 
have led to an over-indulgence of older businesses and not 
enough encouragement of new and emerging businesses. 
 
I cannot agree with any of these views.  In particular, I cannot agree with 
the view that Hong Kong’s economic difficulties from 1997-2003 were 
structural.  Structural problems do not suddenly surface and suddenly 
disappear.  Although there are indeed some structural problems in Hong 
Kong, the same can be said of most economies.  One can easily discover 
various forms of structural problems in the U.S., in Japan, in Thailand, in 
mainland China, in Taiwan, and so on.  It is true that some costs in Hong 
Kong are very high, particularly land costs, and that this is making life 
difficult for some businesses.  It is true that some university graduates do 
not have the necessary skills and attitudes to compete effectively in the 
market.  It is also true that some businesses were not innovative enough, 
and that they under-invest in R&D.  It is also true that Hong Kong’s fiscal 
revenues are quite dependent on the land market, and that if the land 
market goes sour, Hong Kong will most likely run a fiscal deficit.  But to 
say that therefore the government needs a more active industrial policy, to 
discover new industries and to support the development of tech industries, 
to reduce the dependence on services, to clamp down its land costs, and to 
steer itself away from a dependence on land as a major source of fiscal 
revenue would be wrong.   
 
To understand Hong Kong, one must understand the market 
 
Unfortunately for Hong Kong, too few people understand the market.  By 
this I mean the strengths and the weaknesses of the free market.  We need 
to have full understanding of the nature of the free market, so we can 
harness its strengths and overcome its weaknesses.  Only when we 
understand the market can we effectively implement the policy of “positive 
non-interventionism,” a term coined by the late and former Financial 
Secretary Haddon-Cave.  The term means that when the government 
chooses not to intervene in the market, it is for a good reason and as a 
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result the non-intervention is positive for the economy.  The corollary of 
the term is that when the government chooses to intervene, there has to be 
a good reason for it to do so.   
 
The first important understanding about the market is that free market 
prices are always the right prices for resource allocation purposes unless 
there are technological externalities such as pollution (a negative 
externality) or public health benefits (a positive externality), excessive 
concentration of market power, or evidence of herd behavior.   
 
The second important understanding about the market is that free market 
prices do not always reward people fairly in the sense of rewarding them 
according to the total contributions that they make to the economy.  This 
means, for example, that a group of people may make much greater 
contribution to the economy this year than last year and yet they are 
rewarded less than last year.  The classical example is the case of 
agriculture.  If farmers have a fantastic bumper crop, their collective 
revenue may actually decline dramatically so that each farmer will collect 
much less than last year. One free market rule is that abundance benefits 
consumers and hurts producers.  
 
On the other hand, if someone owns a special talent, or owns a prime site, 
he can collect very large earnings when the competition for such talent or 
the location increases.   
 
This means that market prices may be wrong prices for distributive 
purposes.  This implies that while we should let the market dictate the 
prices in order to achieve economic efficiency, we may have to adopt some 
redistributive measures to achieve fairness and maintain social harmony. 
 
The third important understanding about the market is that in the event of 
technological externalities, economic agents should be asked to pay for the 
negative externalities and should be subsidized for the positive 
externalities that they cause by their activities. 
 
The fourth important understanding is that excessive concentration of 
market power is detrimental to efficient resource allocation and fair 
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competition.  Some form of intervention or regulation may then be 
appropriate.  
 
The fifth important understanding is that herd behavior may occur, and 
investors as a group may be excessively exuberant or pessimistic.  
Government intervention may again be appropriate.   
 
In the rest of this paper, I shall go through each of these in turn.  But I 
will summarize my understanding about the major strengths and 
weaknesses of the Hong Kong economy as follows.  Hong Kong’s 
traditional “positive non-interventionism” has effectively nurtured Hong 
Kong’s competitiveness.  Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs have developed a 
high sensitivity to the forces of the market, so that they generally respond 
very rapidly to the turns of the market, and they also have been quite able 
to capitalize on any emerging opportunities.  Thus, for example, many of 
Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs started investing on the mainland in the 1980s, 
well before others did so.  They were ready to grasp the opportunities 
presented to them as the Mainland opened up.  Not all of these ventures 
were successful, of course, and many entrepreneurs had suffered losses due 
to various reasons, including fraud and unfair treatment by their Mainland 
partners.  But that did not deter them to continue to seek business 
opportunities.  On the whole Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs achieved huge 
gains in their Mainland ventures.  In regard to R&D Hong Kong’s 
entrepreneurs have concentrated on those kinds in which they enjoy a 
comparative advantage.  For example, we do not have pharmaceutical 
companies that spend huge sums developing new drugs, but we have 
developed very successful items such as the Octopus card and electronic 
educational toys that rely less on primary research and more on design.  
Thus Hong Kong is strong in applying modern technology.  Moreover, by 
various measures, such as trade-to-GDP ratios, per capita IDD calls, and 
internet usage intensity, Hong Kong is one of the most globalized 
economies in the world.  Hong Kong people are about the most traveled 
in the world, and they have established excellent connections world wide.  
All this means that Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs are well positioned to take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization.   
 
Hong Kong has some serious weaknesses too, but high cost is not one of 
them.  As a matter of fact, in a free market economy high cost generally 
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reflects the attractiveness of the place.  Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs tend 
to be short-sighted.  Short term gains are considered important.  Long 
term gains on the other hand are significantly discounted.  The glaring 
example is the excessive aggressiveness of hotels during the handover, to 
the extent that travelers feel ripped off.  Entrepreneurs appear to be 
impatient for longer term investments.  Some entrepreneurs, particularly 
in the restaurant business, shirk their responsibilities and systematically 
exploit their employees, even to the extent of declaring bankruptcy and 
then opening up another restaurant with another name.  More recently the 
government has laid charges on some law violators.  The widening 
income and wealth gap is a major problem besetting the Hong Kong 
society and could become a problem for the economy if social stability is 
at risk.  
 
Common Myths about the Hong Kong Economy 
 
The HKUST Report is right in pointing out that there are some commonly 
believed myths about the Hong Kong economy.  Such “myths” include 
the beliefs that Hong Kong operates on a laizzez-faire basis, that markets 
in Hong Kong are all free and competitive, and that Hong Kong has hardly 
any manufacturing activities.  The HKUST team pointed out that “the 
Government has always monopolized land,” that market concentration is a 
big problem, that in fact the government often interferes with the working 
the market particularly in regard to land and real estate.  Moreover, while 
the share of GDP due to manufacturing is rather small, as much as 40% of 
Hong Kong’s GDP is somehow related to manufacturing, and the activities 
may take the form of services.   
 
I agree that Hong Kong is indeed not a purely laissez-faire economy.  But 
then who else is?  While the Government does monopolize the final 
ownership of land, and there are zoning laws and building codes to govern 
land development, the ownership of the right to use land is quite dispersed, 
and the government does not interfere with the transactions of properties as 
long as they are within the law.  While market concentration is indeed a 
problem and there is a clear case to introduce competition law in Hong 
Kong, the “monopolization of land” by the government would not be a 
problem if the government releases land against the single criterion of 
marginal social benefit being larger than marginal social cost.  If such 
 8
land release policy results in land prices that are too high for some 
businesses to swallow, so be it.  In 1994 the government decided that 
there was speculation and went about interfering with the speculative 
activities.  This was a big departure from the tradition and might have 
been the main cause behind the overheating of the housing market in 
1996-97.  Notwithstanding Annex III of the Sino-British Declaration 
capping annual release of land at 50 hectares, there is not evidence that the 
colonial Government had ever intentionally restricted land supply to boost 
its coffers.  In general, if the land release policy follows the marginal 
benefit marginal cost rule, but a business still finds it difficult to survive 
the high land costs in Hong Kong, the problem would lie with that business, 
which had better relocate elsewhere, and not with high land costs. 
 
Another myth, not mentioned in the UST report, is that the most urgent and 
serious problem besetting the Hong Kong economy today is NOT to find a 
new direction for the economy, but to appropriately deal with the widening 
income disparity, the pervasive poverty in some communities such as Tin 
Shui Wai and Shum Shui Po, and the sense of injustice this engenders.  
Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs are quite capable of, and are certainly far 
better positioned than government bureaucrats or academics, in finding out 
all the profitable opportunities that can be discovered.  We can rely on the 
market to deal with economic restructuring.  All that the government 
needs to do is to work with the market and to provide the necessary 
institutional and infrastructural support the market needs. 
 
Although there has been significant measures taken by the government to 
alleviate the plight of the underprivileged, such as the public housing, free 
education, and subsidized health care, many families have difficulties 
making ends meet, working and toiling long hours notwithstanding.  This 
has given fresh calls for capping long working hours and for introducing a 
legal minimum wage in Hong Kong.  The SAR Government responded 
with a “wage protection movement” for cleaning workers and security 
guards, which are well known for their low wages.  Announced in the 
2006-07 Policy Address in October by the Chief Executive Donald Tsang, 
the wage protection movement is just a plead to the social conscience of 
business leaders to offer their cleaning workers and security guards wages 
no lower than the average wage rate for those occupations as reported in 
the Quarterly Report of Wage and Payroll Statistics published by the 
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Census and Statistics Department.  The Government promised to 
“monitor the effectiveness of the Wage Protection Movement through the 
LAB (Labour Advisory Board) and conduct a comprehensive review two 
years after implementation. If the review finds that the Movement has 
failed to yield satisfactory results, we will set out to prepare for the 
introduction of legislation for a minimum wage in the cleansing and 
guarding services sectors.” Given its voluntary participation nature, 
notwithstanding circulars sent to members by the Hong Kong General 
Chamber of Commerce stating its support for the movement, participation 
is miniscule.  For June 2006, the average hourly market wage stood at 
$22.8 for lavatory cleaners and $24.2 for general cleaners.  Security 
guards earned $23.2 to $30.6 per hour on average depending on the pattern 
of shift required.  Such hourly wage works out to about $5000 to $6000 
per month.  Assuming both husband and wife make such wages, raising a 
family will remain very difficult, and life would be very hard indeed for 
those who earn lower than such wages.  By the end of 2006, according to 
legislator Leung Yiu Chung, only about 600 enterprises had responded 
positively to the Wage Protection Movment. (Mingpao, 27 December 
2006) 
 
Notwithstanding the drop in unemployment from a high of 8.7 per cent 
around June 2003 to below 4.5 per cent by the end of 2006 many people 
continue to struggle with low incomes.  The persistence of low incomes is 
evident in the fact that as of 2007 taxi drivers are still caught in a vicious 
competition, with many offering deep discounts for long distance travelers.  
For this reason when Chief Executive Donald Tsang referred to the Hong 
Kong economy as in the best shape in 20 years he elicited a lot of 
criticisms.  For example the Editorial of Oriental Daily criticized Tsang as 
“gross exaggeration” (3 January 2007).  The editorial cited a survey that 
indicated that only about 30% of the respondents enjoyed an improvement 
over ten years ago while about 36% indicated a decline in the standard of 
living.  It criticized Tsang as either intending to mislead or “seeing the 
wood but missing the forest.”   
 
Financialization and Globalization 
 
The Chief Executive was right if he was referring to the stock market or to 
the price that a piece of land on the peak sought in the last auction of the 
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year.  The Hang Seng Index surpassed the 20,000 level for the first time 
ever in 2006 and a 7,353 square meter luxury residential site on Mount 
Kellett Road at the Peak in Hong Kong fetched 1.8 billion HK dollars 
(about 231 million U.S. dollars), shattering all records for the per square 
foot price. (http://english.cri.cn/3130/2006/12/19/262@175843.htm 
accessed 1 February 2007) It is clear that the rich, particularly the 
super-rich, have never been so rich before and the excess liquidity is 
driving up prime asset prices.  This phenomenon has even attracted a new 
term “financialization” and is global.  The availability of excess liquidity 
on the one hand, and the drying up of profitable real investment 
opportunities in manufacturing and even services on the other hand, means 
that financial investments often bring higher returns than real investment.  
Engelbert Stockhammer (2004) summarized his paper with this: “Over the 
past decades, the financial investment of non-financial businesses has been 
rising, and the accumulation of capital goods has been declining.”  Hard 
work and hard investment often bring soft or meager returns.  Speculative 
financial investments and investment in valuable assets of various kinds, 
including works of art, prime property, and antiques, on the other hand, 
often bring handsome, even huge profits.  This is just a simple reflection 
of the working of supply and demand forces.  When too many people 
seek employment, wages fall.  When too many competitors seek 
opportunities in manufacturing and in services, returns on such new 
investments fall. The fact is, new profitable investment opportunities 
among the traditional industries are becoming harder and harder to find.  
The money that fails to find such profitable investment opportunities often 
end up chasing after rare assets, whose prices therefore have kept rising. 
 
This is not to say that enterprises in the traditional industries do not make 
big money.  They may.  Such global companies as Walmart, Ikea, 
McDonnell, Nike, Starbucks, and Louis Vuitton are extremely profitable. 
These companies benefit tremendously from the opportunities made 
available to them by globalization.  Their strengths may be derived from 
the scale of their operations which give them extremely good bargaining 
power when it comes to sourcing their supplies, or from the sheer size of 
the market to which they can sell their goods and services.  They may be 
derived from the cost savings due to global production and sourcing, or 
from the price premiums that consumers are willing to pay for the use or 
ownership of “super-brand” products.  The sales of Walmart, Ikea, and 
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McDonnell are targeted at the mass market, and certainly benefited from 
the low-cost sourcing and the scale of their operations.  Those of Nikon, 
Nike, and Louis Vuitton on the other hand are targeted at the high end 
market, with their goods selling at premium prices reflecting the economic 
rent generated by the brand name, which becomes both a status symbol and 
an icon for quality. Starbucks and Pacific Coffee target at the burgeoning 
economically comfortable middle class.  The key point is that while big 
money is made by some traditional enterprises which have successfully 
established themselves, and by a few very innovative enterprises which 
have been able to harness the opportunities presented by globalization, 
additional opportunities for productive investment are few and far between.  
The excess liquidity therefore end up buying financial and real assets and 
collectibles and boosting their prices, which then further vindicate the 
wisdom of such investments. 
 
Real estate of course is one key destination where such money ends up.  
Over the past ten years investment in real estate has been very profitable 
globally.  For a few years Hong Kong seemed to be the only exception, 
and those were the years from 1998 to 2003, when prices of homes, offices, 
as well as retail premises all plummeted in a gigantic way.  While many 
blamed this “bursting of the bubble” to the Asian Financial Crisis, I have 
offered an alternative explanation (Ho and Wong, 2006), and suggested 
that the government’s policies were to blame.  The government not only 
dramatically boosted supply with an annual production target 85,000 
residential units a year, but also killed demand by the public housing 
privatization scheme that offered sitting tenants of selected public housing 
blocks the opportunity of buying their own units at as much as 12% of the 
estimated market price.  I argued that such a policy effectively destroyed 
any interest in the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) which had served as 
the “next step” in the home upgrading ladder for public housing tenants 
since 1978.  The TPS made HOS look extremely unattractive, effectively 
undercutting interest in both new HOS units and old units put on the 
market by their current owners intending to trade up.  Since housing was 
also an important collateral for small and medium enterprises when they 
seek loans, the decline in the housing market also affected businesses and 
really struck a serious blow to the economy.  With the economy falling 
into deep recession in 1998 and hardly recovering at all in 1999, the SAR 
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government’s fiscal position quickly turned into red, exactly as I had 
predicted in 1997 and 1998. 
 
Market Rents, Economic Rents, and the Conflict between Allocation and 
Distribution Goals 
 
One important aspect of the market that policy analysts and policy makers 
need to understand is that the market both creates “rent” and destroys 
“rent.”  In this context, I am referring to what economists call economic 
rent.  David Ricardo, the classical economist, discovered economic rent 
and explained that fertile land attracts bidders and so commands a price 
premium over non-fertile land.  Under perfect competition, after paying 
the price premium for the use of the land, a farmer who works on fertile 
land will fare just as well as a farmer who works on non-fertile land.  
Thus competition creates rent and destroys abnormal profits.  Today, in 
Hong Kong we hardly have commercial farming, but Ricardo’s idea still 
holds for an urban economy.  Premises at the most attractive locations 
always command a price premium over those at other locations.  
Competition creates rent over scarce factors in exactly the same way as 
Ricardo depicted in the 19th Century.  The key difference between true 
economic rent and “quasi-rent” is whether the scarcity of the factor of 
production in question is enduring or not. 
 
If one owns a truly scarce factor that can hardly be duplicated, or when 
demand for it rises faster than it can be duplicated, the economic rent will 
increase with competition.  Say, we have a prime location that shoppers 
find extremely convenient.  It is evidently very valuable.  From the 
resource allocation point of view we do want the highest bidder to have the 
use of it, since the highest bidder can generate the most income from it and 
can therefore afford to pay higher rent than anyone else.  This 
demonstrates the rationality of market rent, no matter how high it goes. 
 
Now suppose some innovative entrepreneur comes in with an idea, and is 
able to double the business volume at this prime location.  He is the only 
one in town who knows how to do this.  He out-competes any other 
bidder and earns a profit that is actually a “rent” due to his innovative idea.  
Unfortunately, he owns no patent to the idea, and his competitors soon 
learn the trick too.  When the lease comes up for renewal, his “quasi-rent” 
 13
disappears, because the rent for the premise is bid up. Competition has now 
destroyed his quasi-rent, and transferred the quasi-rent to the landlord.  
The landlord who owns the property did not do anything but benefits from 
the innovative idea.  The entrepreneur has to come up with yet another 
idea in order to make any profit again. 
 
We can see in this example that when ideas can be copied freely 
hard-working people including the entrepreneurs in the end only make 
“normal returns.”  There is economic growth, but the main benefit 
actually is captured by the landlord. 
 
A paradox about the market is that while the workers and the innovative 
entrepreneurs generate economic growth, they may not benefit from it.  In 
the earlier example it is the landlord who benefits.  But it is also possible 
that consumers benefit.  It is well known that in a bumper crop, farmers’ 
total income may fall.  If the excessive production comes from an 
innovative farmer whose idea is quickly copied by all other  farmers, 
consumers benefit from the decline in prices, but farmers as a group 
actually earn much less than otherwise without the innovation.  Farmers’ 
total contribution to society has gone up because total output is higher.  
But farmers’ total income and hence average income is lowered.  More 
specifically, globalization and improved technology means that there were 
many more coffee producers in 2000 than say in 1990.  The intensifying 
competition, which is further aggravated by the reduction in the number of 
buyers globally, has impoverished many coffee farmers.  The gross 
imbalance in bargaining power between buyers and sellers led to very low 
coffee prices and has given rise to the call for fair trade. 
 
Hong Kong of course does not grow coffee.  But a similar story is 
happening here too.  Because of the large number of unskilled workers 
who are available in the market, both in and outside Hong Kong, the wages 
of unskilled workers have hardly grown at all over the past decade, even 
though they may be working harder and their productivity is rising. 
 
For these reasons, I have long argued that we need a more aggressive 
redistributive policy in Hong Kong.  I would not interfere with prices, 
because the prices are effective in promoting efficient resource allocation.  
But market prices may be unfair.  The redistribution that I am talking 
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about is NOT a “welfare”, NOR is it a redistribution from those who are 
productive and earn more to those who are less productive and earn less.  
The redistribution is necessary because the market mechanism does not 
reward fairly those who are the most productive and who actually 
contribute to the economic progress. 
 
Financial Centre, Pollution, and the World City 
 
The SAR Government identified four “pillar industries” of Hong Kong.  
These are Finance, Trade and Logistics, Tourism, and Specialized Business 
and Supporting Services.  As a small open economy with little natural 
resources except its harbor and geographic location these “pillar 
industries” are indeed all very important to Hong Kong.  In 2005, total 
exports inclusive of services were almost double the size of the GDP, while 
total imports exceeded 185 per cent of the GDP, Hong Kong obviously 
depends on trading to survive.  But finance is unique in that while only 
5.5% of the workforce worked in the industry in 2002, it accounted for 
12.2% of the GDP.  The relative value added per worker is much lower 
for any of the three other pillar industries.  In trade and logistics, the share 
of employment in the economy was 24.1% but the share of the GDP was 
26.5%.  As it happens, the importance of tourism appears to have been 
exaggerated considerably in the media.  The share of employment was 
only 3.9% while the share of the GDP was even lower, at 3.0%.  For this 
reason, the claim that CEPA and individualized travel from the Mainland, 
which was officially launched in 2003, jumpstarted the economy, has little 
credibility. 
 
Regardless of the talk about pillar industries, Hong Kong is today an 
important trading hub and a major international financial centre, and Hong 
Kong is likely to remain so in the years to come.2  In a recent book China, 
Hong Kong, and the World Economy (Ho and Ash, eds. 2006), Jao 
concluded: “as long as Hong Kong distinguishes itself from other Chinese 
cities in respect of currency convertibility, capital mobility, economic 
                                                 
2 This is indeed how the Chief Executive pictured Hong Kong in his latest assessment on 15 
January 2007, following Economic Summit on China’s 11th Five-Year Plan and Development 
of HK.  He said: “Under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, the country has 
highlighted Hong Kong’s role and the direction of our economic development in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan, that is to develop financial, logistics, tourism and IT industries and to 
preserve our status as an international financial, trade and shipping centre.” 
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freedom, rule of law, and the quality of prudential supervision and 
corporate governance, it will remain China’s main OFC (offshore financial 
centre)….  From Hong Kong’s own point of view, the territory remains an 
integrated finical centre, and an IFC (international financial centre) in its 
own right.” (p.146)  With a total market capitalization of over HK$13.33 
trillion (US$1.71 trillion) as of December 2006, the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange ranks 7th in the world by market capitalization of listed 
companies.  This ranking is expected to further move up over the next 
years, with more and more Mainland companies seeking listing in Hong 
Kong.   
 
I am not interested in the ranking of Hong Kong in the world in this or in 
that, but in Hong Kong doing all it can and all it should to capitalize on the 
opportunities that are available.  In this regard, I am particularly keen to 
point to the importance of each and every distinction that Jao alluded to 
Hong Kong: currency convertibility, capital mobility, economic freedom, 
rule of law, and the quality of prudential supervision, as well as corporate 
governance.  Absent any of these factors, Hong Kong as an international 
financial centre would be gone.  But I do not think that Hong Kong needs 
to be the only city in China with these factors.  Many people are worried 
that should the RMB become fully convertible Hong Kong as a financial 
centre could be marginalized given the lower costs in China.  Such 
worries are misplaced.  In practice financial centres are not like 
manufacturing bases in that for financial centres costs seldom count.  
What count are investors’ confidence about effective and appropriate 
regulations, the rule of law, and efficiency.  High costs are often the result 
of the success of a city as a financial centre.  On the other hand low costs 
have never been an important factor behind any city’s emerging as a 
financial centre.   
 
I cannot subscribe to the notion that the government needs to find new 
directions for the Hong Kong economy.  As long as we have free markets, 
the economy will adjust, and how to achieve the necessary “economic 
restructuring” to keep up with the times will never be a problem that policy 
makers need to worry about.  Yes we will need to worry about the 
problems that restructuring may bring, but if we have an adequate and 
well-functioning social safety net, those who suffer temporarily will have 
their suffering relieved and it will be bearable.  But we will not need to 
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preempt our entrepreneurs who are in the market place and who are so 
sensitized to the market that you can be sure they will make the necessary 
adjustments.  Yes we will need to worry about improving our education 
and vocational training, but that is an ongoing thing.  We will need to 
nurture a new generation of entrepreneurs and workers who have the 
stamina and the preparation to face challenges, but why would policy 
makers ever need to discover new “sunrise industries”?  Sadly for Hong 
Kong, many commentators continue to ask such questions, putting 
pressures on the government to preempt the market.  That would simply 
be wrong.  In retrospect, none of the “centres” that Mr. Tung Chee-hwa 
envisaged for Hong Kong ever came to fruition.   
 
On the other hand, Hong Kong is developing in its own way, driven by 
market forces, to become a leading international financial centre.  Of 
course there are circumstances driving these developments, but they are 
not by the design of the SAR government.  China is fast taking off, and 
many private enterprises are seeking capital to fund their operations.  
Many SOEs are being reformed and transformed.  Many are becoming 
very profitable.  Hong Kong has very nice traditions in upholding the rule 
of law and is commanding a lot of confidence from investors.  Far more 
important than infrastructures, institutions and culture and business 
practices count and weigh heavily in investors’ minds, when it comes to 
financial services.  Hong Kong has clear natural advantages and need to 
build on these advantages to push itself forward.  The RMB can become 
completely convertible overnight, but business practices and culture can 
never change over night.   
 
What Hong Kong really needs to do is to make itself into a livable city, a 
fair city, a city with social harmony and respect and tolerance for 
differences.  Hong Kong has been suffering from serious pollution, 
particularly air pollution, and in order to attract the best talents to work for 
Hong Kong, we really have to make our city clean and livable.  It is well 
known that educated people and financially well-off people are very much 
concerned health and the health and the education of their children.  If we 
have serious pollution, if our education system is lousy, or if we have poor 
healthcare, we will never be able to attract the talents we need to make 
Hong Kong into a top financial centre.   
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Thus, when on 27 November 2006, the Chief Executive signed the Clean 
Air Charter on behalf of the HKSARG, he was not making an economic 
sacrifice.  He was, rather, investing in Hong Kong’s future.  It is time we 
count the cost to air quality as an economic cost. The Charter was initiated 
by the business sector in support of the Government’s appeal to improve 
air quality in Hong Kong. Signatories of the Charter are committed to 
carrying out the following measures at their daily operational level to help 
reduce emissions –  
 
(a) operating by recognized world class standard; 
(b) using continuous emissions monitors; 
(c) publishing information on energy and fuel use; 
(d) adopting energy-efficient measures; 
(e) taking appropriate measures during days of high pollution; and 
(f) sharing air quality expertise with others. 
 
The Charter is a voluntary act on the part of the business sector and should 
certainly be applauded.  It is gratifying to see that there are businessmen 
who understand that air pollution is bad for business, and particularly bad 
for a financial centre.  But voluntary acts are not enough.  If a business 
costs others heavily but benefits privately by polluting activities there is a 
good possibility that it would pollute.  Thus, regulations, pollution taxes, 
or emission trading may be necessary.  It is nice to see that the SAR 
government is using a multi-thronged approach in dealing with pollution.  
The concept of emission trading is particularly interesting, as it directly 
deals with cross border pollution, but the scheme as proposed by the 
HKSAR may not be fair to Hong Kong, since it requires both power 
companies on the Mainland as well as Hong Kong’s power companies to 
curtail their current emission levels by the same percentage.  Given that 
Hong Kong’s power companies have already achieved a much lower 
emission level than those on the Mainland, it will be much more costly for 
Hong Kong’s power companies to reduce emission levels by the same 
percentage than Mainland’s power companies.  They are expected 
therefore to buy emission quotas from the Mainland companies, effectively 
subsidizing the emission reduction efforts of the latter, and this will end up 
being paid for by of Hong Kong’s consumers, who will certainly have to 
pay higher electricity bills. 
 
 18
Competition Policy 
 
The SAR government is well aware of the importance of “free and fair 
competition” in promoting economic efficiency and a healthy market 
economy.  However, to date the government has followed only a “sectoral 
approach”, and refused to enact a comprehensive competition law.  In 
2000 and 2001, the government has passed laws prohibiting certain types 
of anti-competition behavior in the telecommunications and the 
broadcasting industries.  According to the consultation document of 2006, 
for the rest of the economy, the Competition Policy Advisory Group 
(COMPAG), which was established in December 1997 and which was 
under the chairmanship of the Financial Secretary, would look at 
complaints of anti-competitive conduct and to investigate any reports of 
possible abuses of dominance.  At the same time, the Consumer Council 
was asked to monitor and review trade practices and sectors prone to unfair 
trading practices.   
 
The rationale behind this sectoral approach is not clear at all.  What 
distinguish telecommunications and broadcasting to warrant special 
treatment?  It seems that the reverse approach would make better sense.  
This reverse approach would apply the comprehensive framework on all 
sectors except the few where special consideration warranted the 
exceptional treatment.  The burden of proof for justifying the exceptions 
must further be placed on the industries that seek the exceptional status.   
 
In any case without a legal framework and the authority to impose 
sanctions, it is not clear what is the point of the investigations in the event 
of reports of possible abuses of dominance or unfair trading practices. To 
put it plainly, neither COMPAG nor the Consumer Council could do 
anything, regardless of the evidence obtained in such investigations.   
 
Following the same logic, we need to raise a simple question.  When 
practically all OECD countries as well as Singapore have already 
introduced competition laws of one sort or another, one needs to ask what 
distinguishes Hong Kong, a mature economy quite comparable to these 
economies, to warrant a different approach to ensuring that competition is 
free and fair?  The Consultation Document says that Hong Kong is a “free 
and open economy” and that there are no significant entry barriers to most 
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industries.  These assertions are however quite misleading.  In 2000 
Carrefour, a major retailer from Europe which successfully took root on 
the Mainland, was forced out of the market in September 2000 after just 
four years in Hong Kong, citing difficulties in securing suitable premises 
and reasonable rent, as well as pressures from some 22 companies not to 
undercut prices. The Consumer Council investigation concluded that 
pressure was applied on Carrefour to keep price levels at the agreed price, 
or they would withdraw their goods for sale. (SCMP, 1 November 2005)  
Thus, barriers to entry in practice, though informal, are real, and they 
certainly had rendered competition far less effective than otherwise. 
 
Paradoxically, the absence of government intervention apparently 
contributed to a “free economy” but in practice hurt the openness of 
various sectors to competition, Hong Kong remaining a truly “open 
economy” in the macro sense notwithstanding. 
 
Related to competition is the subject of regulations of public utilities, 
particularly the power companies, which have been enjoying profit 
protection under the Scheme of Control.  There are two power companies 
in Hong Kong, the China Light and Power Ltd., and Hong Kong Electric 
Company.  The former was founded in 1901 and supplied electricity to 
Kowloon and the New Territories except Lamma Island.  Hong Kong 
Electric Company Ltd. was established in 1889 and serves Hong Kong 
Island and Lamma Island.  They operate under the Scheme of Control 
which would expire in 2008 and the new terms are currently under 
negotiation.  The existing Scheme allows both companies to reap a profit 
at 13.5% of the total value of the average net fixed assets per year plus 
1.5% of the shareholders’ investments made after 30th September 1978 
For Acquiring Fixed Assets.  When profits exceed such permitted rates of 
return, the excess would go into a Development Fund.  When profits fall 
short, the companies are permitted to raise charges.  The current version 
of Scheme of Control was established in 1992, at a time when inflation was 
high and the rates of return looked more reasonable.  In today’s low 
inflation environment, it is generally believed that the permitted rates of 
profit are too high.  Moreover, many commentators have pointed to the 
distortion of incentives since the permitted profit rates are based on 
average net fixed assets.  The terms clearly would encourage excessive 
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investment in assets and may well have been behind the gross 
over-estimation of power consumption growth in the past years.   
 
The rationale behind the Scheme of Control is to provide incentives for the 
power companies to invest and to serve Hong Kong’s best interest.  But 
boosting the size of net assets will also allow the companies to reap 
handsome profit.  As a matter of fact, 13.5% guaranteed profit is very 
high, if one considers that there is hardly any risk.  On the other hand, if 
the profit was generated through efficient and innovative productive 
activities, we should not cap it and should allow the company to earn as 
much as it can.  In the case of electricity generation, given the monopoly 
position of the power companies, higher profit can be achieved simply by 
raising charges.  That is why any Scheme of Control would not make 
much sense.  Instead of renewing the Scheme of Control when it expires 
in 2008, it is far better regulating electricity charges to make them in line 
with global levels, while putting up the right of operation for open bidding.  
We can spell out the terms of operation clearly, and require that the 
successful bidder pay the original operator for the undepreciated value of 
the original investment.  Of course China Light and Power as well as 
Hong Kong Electric are both invited to bid.  If they win, they would 
simply be “paying themselves” to acquire the undepreciated assets.  We 
should also allow the possibility that either company takes over the 
operation of the other company too.  If prices are regulated in a 
transparent way, bidders will take full account of the conditions and their 
bids will reflect such restrictions.  We can also get the help of 
independent appraisers to assess the values of the undepreciated assets of 
the companies, which can be announced before the bidding day.  Once 
this is done, we can let the companies make as much profit as they can 
without regulation. 
 
Speculation, Herd Behaviour, and the Incursion into the Stock Market 
 
Speculation is a scary word for policy makers. In 1994, the Hong Kong 
Government introduced rather drastic measures to curb speculation in the 
housing market, which then rapidly cooled off.  But it then went back up 
in no less than a year, and in 1996 and 1997 housing prices went through 
the roof.  Today it is widely held that speculation caused the housing 
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bubble, which then burst in 1998 plunging the economy into a deep 
recession.  
 
In the Report of the Task Force on Land Supply and Property Prices 
Planning, environment and Lands Branch June 1994 reference to the high 
vacancy rate for large developments as prima facie evidence of hoarding.  
Various measures were implemented to increase the cost of speculation and 
to reduce the profitability of speculation, such as confiscating 5% of the 
purchase price held as deposit if the purchaser fails to sign the formal sale 
and purchase agreement or if he enters into a Cancellation Agreement with 
the developer, and disallowing resale before the issuance of the certificate 
of compliance or the consent to assign. Despite the measures, housing 
prices surged again in the first quarter of 1996, and continued to rise 
through October 1997, ignoring the Asian Financial Crisis for a moment 
after it broke out in July. 
 
It was against this background that Hong Kong people welcomed the 
announcement of Tung Chee-hwa to increase housing supply to no less 
than 85,000 units a year.  It was widely believed that the surge in housing 
price before 1997 reflected shortage, and that the shortage was artificially 
propagated by the provision in Annex III of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984 stipulating that the Government should not grant more 
than 50 hectares of land (excluding land to be granted to the Hong Kong 
Housing Authority for public rental housing) without the approval of the 
Land Commission comprising of equal members from the British and the 
Chinese sides. There is little doubt that speculative pressures were very 
much behind the run-up in housing prices prior to 1997, as many indicators 
do show that prices were rising out of the range that would be expected 
from forecasts based on economic fundamentals.  However, to conclude 
that there is a gross imbalance between supply and demand would be 
wrong. 
 
As pointed out in Ho (2003), while the number of households did exceed 
the number of dwelling units in the early 1980s, this had been reversed by 
1990, and all through 1997 the number of housing units actually exceeded 
the number of dwelling units.  There was therefore no physical shortage.  
Much of the surge in housing prices had reflected a rise in people’s wealth, 
and this is further multiplied by the effect of savings pouring into the 
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housing market from among the public housing tenants who had enjoyed 
low rent but rising incomes.  The latter effect was especially magnified 
when the government introduced in April 1987 a policy of making richer 
tenants pay higher rent.   
 
Thus from the first day, the medicine of increasing supply was wrong for 
the illness, if there was an illness.  It is well known that speculative 
demand can surge and disappear overnight.  It is just not realistic to even 
attempt to get even with speculative demand, because supply produced 
cannot disappear overnight as demand can.  There will be an overhang of 
excess supply whenever speculative demand subsides.  Thus, we should 
attempt to produce supply to match society’s long term needs, and simply 
let prices move up and down in the short run.  If prices are momentarily 
too high and have to fall back, those who pay too high a price will suffer a 
loss.  If prices are momentarily too low and have to rise, those who have 
the insight to the real situation will gain.  This will give speculators as 
well as homebuyers the incentives to be alert.   
 
Unfortunately the SAR Government read the signs wrong, and went about 
trying to boost supply even in 1998, when demand had actually shrunk 
tremendously both as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis and the Tenants 
Purchase Scheme.  So the dramatic collapse of housing prices and the 
deep recession came as no surprise. (Ho, 1998) 
 
With the economy bleeding, the hungry sharks lurking in the background 
eventually made a strike at Hong Kong.  By a “double play” strategy, 
hedge funds made huge profits selling short the Hang Seng Index Futures 
and driving interest rates up at the same time putting pressures on the Hong 
Kong dollar.  This strategy, together with a narrative of the counter-attack 
by the Government, is explained in the official SAR website 
(http://www.info.gov.hk/info/sar2/economy.htm):  
 
“Severe and sustained market disorder prompted the government to launch 
a defensive incursion into the stock and futures markets in mid-August. 
The government spent a total of HK$118 billion (US$15.1 billion) buying 
the 33 constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Index. During the defence, 
turnover reached a record HK$79 billion (US$10.1 billion) on 28 August, 
the last day of trading for the month. 
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“Although controversial, the actions preserved the integrity of the financial 
markets and prevented a general loss of confidence in Hong Kong’s 
economy. The government’s actions were generally well received by both 
the domestic and international community. Opinion within the investment 
community was divided between those who believed it was the right thing 
to do under such contrived and unusual circumstances and those who 
believed market forces should have been given free reign and that the 
Hong Kong SAR Government had broken a cardinal rule by intervening in 
the stock market.” 
 
The “incursion” was very successful.  Psychologically it immediately 
reversed the herd behaviour of the public.  The Heng Seng Index 
rebounded and continued to surge soon after that.  The profits from the 
action actually brought a handsome profit.  The Exchange Fund 
Investment Ltd. was set up in October 1998 at arm’s length from the 
Government and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority was entrusted with 
the task of managing the share portfolio, with the long-term aim of 
reducing the government’s Hong Kong equity holdings to an amount equal 
to about 5% of the total assets of the HKSARG’s Exchange Fund. The 
government’s Hong Kong equity share portfolio was valued at HK$190 
billion (US$22.8 billion) at the end of April 1999. The Tracker Fund of 
Hong Kong (TraHK) was launched in November 1999 as the first step in 
the Government’s disposal programme with an initial public offer worth 
HK$33.3 billion (approximately US$4.3 billion).  Since the IPO, 
approximately HK$140.4 billion (by 15 October 2002) in Hang Seng Index 
constituent stocks has been returned to the market. 
(http://www.trahk.com.hk/eng/homepage.html) 
 
Just as the Government had “incurred” successfully into the stock market, 
in the end reaping a handsome profit and saving the stock market from 
even greater losses and ultimately reviving confidence in the Hong Kong 
economy, so it really should have considered a similar move in the face of 
gross excessive supply in the housing market.  Such moves of course 
would attract severe criticisms from some liberal economists.  Indeed I 
recall that Steven Cheung, the noted liberal economist, had described the 
government’s incursion into the stock market as silly and like “dumping 
bags of sand to fill the ocean.”  But there are times when asset prices 
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grossly deviate from underlying values based on economic fundamentals, 
such as when there is herd behaviour aggravating a loss of confidence or 
when there is a gross oversupply.  One might think that we should let 
prices fall to “eliminate” the oversupply, but this thinking is extremely 
dangerous in the case of the housing market.  Housing is such an 
important asset that declines in market prices due to a gross oversupply 
could damage the economy severely.  Moreover, a gross oversupply of 
housing can never be eliminated by a decline in prices, and could lead to 
Hong Kong’s homeowners being bankrupted and their homes being taken 
up by bargain-hunters from overseas. Withholding part of the excess 
supply from the market and releasing it slowly, on the other hand, is a 
responsible response in an over-supply situation, makes eminent economic 
sense, and would have helped moved the real economic recovery much 
earlier. 
 
Does High Cost Erode Hong Kong’s Competitiveness and Marginalize the 
Hong Kong Economy? 
 
I am not in favour of a “high land price policy” nor a “low land price 
policy.”  In a well functioning market, with no impediments or artificial 
boosts in supplies, prices should seek the equilibrium market levels.  The 
SAR Government should not prejudge if housing prices are too high or too 
low.  However, it is very important that supply and demand balance, and 
that means the Government should provide as much as, and only as much 
land as can be absorbed by the market—provided that the value of the new 
development is larger than the social cost of the new development.  There 
are two ways of counting the social cost of the land supplied.  First is the 
social cost of making a plot of land usable and available.  This could 
entail reclamation, providing access roads, providing incidental urban 
services, etc.  Second is the opportunity cost of making a plot of land 
available to developers now rather than in the future.  If a plot of land is 
released now, it may no longer be available in the future.  If this 
“marginal rule” is followed, I would like land price be dictated by the 
market forces. 
 
If the economy is very attractive to investors and buyers are cash-rich, it is 
entirely possible that the resulting land price still appear to be expensive in 
comparison with land prices elsewhere.  This may only reflect the 
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premium that investors are prepared to pay for Hong Kong’s unique 
characters: low profit and income taxes, political and social stability, a 
vibrant economy, excellent prospects, etc.  If so, then the high land prices 
in Hong Kong only testify to Hong Kong’s attractiveness and 
competitiveness.  There will be nothing to worry about.  Even though 
some industries may find it hard to survive in Hong Kong’s high cost 
environment, still it does not matter, because their departure only makes 
way for other more competitive industries.  Of course one may still ask: 
why not provide more land at lower cost so these less profitable industries 
can still find a place in Hong Kong.  As explained in the foregoing 
paragraph, this depends on the marginal benefit of providing the land 
versus the marginal cost of doing so.  Only if it can be demonstrated that 
the marginal benefit is higher than the marginal cost should the additional 
land be provided for development purposes. 
 
Worried if Hong Kong’s competitiveness was being hurt by developers’ 
greed, Sin-ming Shaw, wrote: 
 
“Local developers sit on $60 billion worth of land, enough to meet private 
housing needs for the next 10 years. These developers are in fact Hong 
Kong’s largest speculative hoarders. Boosting property values may 
provide temporary relief, but it raises the hurdle of investment returns, 
deterring business expansions and start-ups. Given that much land is held 
by a cartel of property companies and not subject to market forces, the 
government should not allow the developers to dictate when they apply for 
rezoning or when they build. Initially, lower real-estate prices will arouse 
ire among homeowners and tycoons, but the alternative—becoming an 
uncompetitive, overpriced backwater—is even more frightening. Falling 
prices will quickly stabilize. The last five years of stagnation plainly show 
that short-term pain is far better than long-term torture.” (Time Asia, 8 
July 2002) 
 
And again: 
 
“An alternative would be to allow asset prices and wages to deflate until 
the market finds its own equilibrium. But the government fears a negative 
effect on Hong Kong's corporations, especially its banks, which rely 
heavily on real-estate revenue. It is also afraid of massive defaults, 
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because numerous homeowners are believed to be suffering from "negative 
equity." These misguided concerns have frozen the debate: no one seems to 
care that lower property prices would attract new home buyers and 
businesses, creating employment. Without bringing costs down, however, 
Hong Kong doesn't have much of a future.” (Time Asia, 3 September 
2001) 
 
The implication of Shaw’s argument is that the developers in Hong Kong 
had withheld supply to produce a shortage and that in turn had kept 
housing prices rising through 1997.  But to follow through the argument 
one has to present the evidence that indeed there was a physical shortage of 
housing.  No one has yet provided the evidence for such a shortage. Did 
we have a low and falling vacancy rate?  Did the number of households 
exceed the number of dwelling units?  Statistically, we have seen, during 
the pre-1997 period, that the number of dwelling units had continued to 
exceed the number of households, and that space per person in each 
dwelling unit had been rising.  Is there any evidence that the supply of 
private housing was stunted before 1997?  The annual supply ranged from 
20,000 units a year to 34,000 units a year between 1987 to 1993.  
Although supply was a bit low in 1994, it went back up to 41,000 units in 
1995, obviously responding to the higher prices leading to 1994. But the 
policy to cramp down on speculation in 1994 actually led to a decline in 
supply, which fell to 10,000 units in 1997 and 16,000 units in 1998.  It 
appears that developers had never artificially withheld supplies.  They 
have actually worked very hard converting agricultural land and industrial 
land to residential and commercial uses.  They have also tried to produce 
as many units as they are allowed under the zoning and town planning 
rules.  If anything, they may be accused of developing too fast.  Many 
citizens, for example, have criticized the government for excessive 
reclamation of the harbor, and they find the International Financial Centre 
II, whose 88 storey office tower rising almost right in the centre of the 
harbour, particularly distasteful.  
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Table 1: Statistics on Compulsory Winding-up and Bankruptcy for the period 1996 to 
11-2006 
Year Bankruptcy Compulsory Winding-up 
 Petitions 
presented 
Receiving/Bankruptcy 
Orders made (Note 1) 
Petitions 
presented 
Winding-up 
Orders made
1996 780 543 742 557 
1997 829 639 658 503 
1998 1362 893 946 723 
1999 3876 3071 1161 795 
2000 5487 4606 1241 910 
2001 13186 9151 1401 1066 
2002 26922 25328 1430 1292 
2003 22092 24922 1451 1248 
2004 12489 13593 1306 1147 
2005 9933 9810 955 849 
2006 through 
November 
9923 9671 633 502 
Note 1: Receiving orders were made upon bankruptcy petitions presented before 1 April 
1998 and bankruptcy orders, after that date. 
Note 2: The number of orders made in a particular month is affected by the number of 
weekly hearings (usually on every Wednesday and, if necessary, Tuesday 
commencing July 1999) in the month when cases are heard in Court. Cases are not 
heard in public holidays.  
Note 3: New statutory provisions came into operation on 1 April 1998. 
Note 4: Petitioners appear to be getting used to new provisions for bankruptcy petitions 
effective from 1 April 1998. 
Source: Official Receiver’s Office 
 
Private housing supply shot up to 54,000 units a year in 2001, following 
the implementation of the “85,000 units a year” policy.  Instead of 
“quickly stabilizing”, the prices fell through the floor, bankrupting tens of 
thousand of families, boosting the suicide rates and hurting business 
sentiments (Table 1).  Only after Michael Suen, Secretary of Housing, 
Planning, and Lands, announced a nine-point strategy, in November 2002, 
that includes supply management and halting the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme after Phase 6A and 6B in 2003, that the groundwork for an 
economic recovery of the economy was laid.  If it had not been for the 
outbreak of SARS that lasted through the middle of 2003, the economy 
probably would have recovered much sooner.  But as it happened, most 
people mistakenly credited the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements 
(CEPA) and individualized travel—both of which were announced in the 
summer of 2003—as the factors that jumpstarted the economy back to a 
growth path.  In point of fact, CEPA saved Hong Kong exporters a total 
of 66.4 million yuan in the first year, when some US$12 billion dollars of 
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Hong Kong exports enjoyed zero tariff access to the China market 
(Mingpao, 25 January 2005). As to the benefits from individualized travel, 
according to the Tourism Bureau, 21.8 million visitors came to Hong Kong 
in 2004, spending a total of 91.8 billion dollars, up almost 20% from the 
previous year.  Of this spending, HK$69.6 billion represents consumption 
spending in Hong Kong. Mainland visitors accounted for about half of this, 
i.e., 38.6 billion. (Mingpao, 10 March 2005)  When it is realized that 
increase represents only a fraction of this and that only a fraction of any 
spending is value added in Hong Kong, such figures are simply miniscule 
to be able to account for the strong recovery of Hong Kong in 2004. 
 
China’s Accession to WTO, RMB Reform and US Dollar Movements 
 
Since 1999, when the US-China WTO agreements were concluded, 
China’s share in world trade has exploded, from some 4 per cent then to 
almost 10 per cent now.  Surging exports boosted the current account 
surplus, while continued inflow of capital maintained a surplus in the 
capital account as well.  China’s foreign exchange reserves had kept 
rising, and pressures for the RMB to appreciate continued to build up.  On 
21 July 2005, the People’s Bank finally decided to shift gear.  The de 
facto link with the US dollar since late 1997 was abandoned, and the RMB 
was immediately devalued by 2.1%.  According to the official statement, 
“China will reform the exchange rate regime by moving into a managed 
floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with 
reference to a basket of currencies. RMB will no longer be pegged to the 
US dollar and the RMB exchange rate regime will be improved with 
greater flexibility.” 
 
Since then the RMB kept appreciating, though occasionally with some 
hiccups, suggesting that there was no basket link in a substantive sense.  
In early January 2007 the RMB yuan was actually valued higher than the 
Hong Kong dollar for the first time since 1994, when China merged the 
official exchange rate with the “Foreign Exchange Adjustment Centre” rate.  
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority, however, maintained that regardless 
of the movement of the RMB in the foreign exchange market, the Hong 
Kong dollar will not change its link with the US dollar.  The rise of the 
Yuan against the Hong Kong dollar will put pressures on Hong Kong’s 
inflation rate but otherwise will benefit the economy by boosting its 
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exports to the Mainland and tourism earnings.  Investment from 
Mainlanders in Hong Kong is also expected to increase. Together with the 
more recent weaknesses in the US dollar, the Hong Kong economy is 
expected to continue to benefit from strong external demand and 
investment inflow.  The outlook for the Hong Kong economy appears 
bright. 
 
It is however interesting to compare the economic growth of Hong Kong in 
2000 with the more recent economic recovery since 2003.  There is little 
doubt that CEPA as announced in 2003 and China’s accession to WTO in 
November 2001 benefited Hong Kong’s external trade.  Hong Kong’s 
domestic exports, which had been falling steadily since 1992, started rising 
again in 2004, although there was a significant decline in the second half of 
2006. (Table 2) Hong Kong’s total trade with the Mainland recorded 4 
consecutive years of double digit growth since 2003.  GDP grew by 10 
per cent in 2000 but only 8.6 per cent in 2004.  The economic growth in 
2000 was driven by very strong total exports, which rose 18%, as 
compared with only 16% in 2004.  But strong growth in 2000 
notwithstanding, housing prices had continued to decline, while the 
unemployment rate dipped only a while and then rose to new highs.  On 
the other hand, the economic growth since 2003 has staying power.  
Housing prices rebounded, while the unemployment rate fell from a peak 
of 8.7 per cent in the second quarter of 2003 to 4.5 per cent by the end of 
2006.  It appears that the change in housing policy as announced in 
November 2002 by Michael Suen has played an important part in the 
stronger staying power of the more recent recovery. 
 
 30  
 31
 
Conclusions 
 
We have reviewed the economic development of Hong Kong since the 
handover and have concluded that there has never been anything 
intrinsically wrong with the Hong Kong economy that ever needed a major 
surgery.  There was indeed a speculative bubble in 1996 and 1997, but it 
was at least partly caused by the anti-speculation measures that 
momentarily suppressed demand in 1994-5 but that also stunted supply at 
the same time.  While there is an ongoing economic restructuring going 
on, there has never been a need for the government to find a new direction 
for the economy. Hong Kong’s entrepreneurs have traditionally been able 
to cope with rapid changes, and have been quite capable of dealing with 
risks and of capitalizing on opportunities that emerge from time to time. 
 
Yet, in a very real sense Hong Kong is indeed in a crossroads.  
Notwithstanding a very bullish stock market, with daily turnovers breaking 
all historical records3 (except the record set by government money going 
into the market on 28 August 1998), a falling unemployment rate, and 
strong economic growth, there are real concerns over the longer term 
stability of the Hong Kong society and economy.  Over the 10 years since 
the handover, income disparity has widened, and it is threatening the 
stability of the society and raising the question if the ongoing tendency 
toward even greater disparity is sustainable.  The latest official figure for 
the Gini coefficient to date is from the 2001 Census, and it had stood at 
5.25 already.  A higher number is expected to be released soon from the 
2006 By-census.  Reflecting such trends is the increasing “narrowness of 
the tax base,” which was the main motive behind the proposal to introduce 
a Goods and Services Tax in Hong Kong.  Although the GST has merits 
in its own right, to suggest that there is anything wrong with the tax system 
because the tax base is too narrow would be wrong.   
 
So far the government’s policy has been contributing to rather than 
reducing income disparity.  With the fiscal budget running big operational 
deficits, the Government had frozen hiring of civil servants but continued 
to recruit contract staff on non-civil service terms, and that means with 
much poorer pay and benefits. On 1 January 2001, the Social Welfare 
Department (SWD) launched the Lump Sum Grant Subvention 
                                                 
3 On 27 October 2006, turnover topped 76 billion dollars, just a shade behind the 79 billion 
dollars on the day of incursion into the stock market, namely 28 August 1998. 
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Arrangement (LSGS Arrangement) for providing financial assistance to 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The subvented organizations, 
under the new arrangement, will not pay workers higher wages than they 
have to.  Because there is an abundance of unskilled workers, their wages 
tend to be depressed, and with an imbalance of bargaining power, unskilled 
workers actually often have to work harder, thus increasing the effective 
supply of workers and putting further pressures on the wages of low skill 
workers.  In many statutory bodies, there are complaints of “fattening the 
top and squeezing the bottom.”  As a matter of fact, the top executives in 
these statutory bodies evidently are earning “economic rent” which were 
really not necessary.  Evidence for this can be found in the fact that these 
positions often attract former civil servants who suddenly earn much 
higher than what they used to make as a civil servant.  To decide if the 
salaries are adequate for such senior positions, the main consideration 
should be whether the current salaries are enough to attract or retain the 
talents who are needed to serve those positions.   
 
As pointed out by the Bauhinia Foundation Research Centre, a private 
think-tank (Mingpao, 10 January 2007), households in the lowest income 
bracket have seen a drop of 20% in their incomes from 1997 to 2005, but 
those in the highest income bracket have seen a rise of 20%.  The richest 
10% of households on average make an income equal to 23 times that 
made by the lowest 10%.  This multiple was only 13 times in 1993.   
 
Against this background, there is little wonder that the proposal to 
introduce the Goods and Salaries Tax met with staunch opposition.  
While the business sector thinks it is bad for business, most people are 
concerned about the regressive nature of the tax.  The measures proposed 
by the Financial Secretary Henry Tang to alleviate the impact on the poor, 
such as refunds for households in the bottom 20% income bracket and cuts 
in rates and water charges, appear to be ad hoc and inadequate.  In the end, 
the Government yielded to public pressure and gave up the idea of 
introducing the GST.   
 
To address the widely recognized poverty problem, late 2006 the 
Government came up with the idea of a “Child Development Fund,” under 
which the Government, the business sector, or some NGO would 
contribute $1 for every dollar saved by the parents for their children’s 
future development.  Henry Tang thinks that this approach to build up 
assets for children is better than giving handouts. 
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(http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200611/10/P200611100213.htm) However, it has 
been pointed out that supporting early child development may be far more 
effective than supporting developmental or educational needs at an older 
age. (Proceedings of National Academy of Science, July 2006)  If parents 
have to, in order to generate the savings to build up assets, reduce spending 
that would have benefited the children at an early age, the harm so caused 
may be much greater than any benefit derived by higher spending when the 
child has grown older.  In any case, for households in great poverty, 
asking parents to produce savings to help their children may be an 
additional source of frustration and distress.  Mr Donald Tsang has 
promised that he will deal with poverty problems in his second term of 
office.  Whether or not he can find an effective way to alleviate the 
income and wealth disparity problem in Hong Kong will prove crucial to 
the status of Hong Kong as a world city over the longer term. 
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